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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JESSE P. HA·NSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsGENERAL BUILDERS SUPPLY
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and STEPHEN G. KNIGHT,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
9884

BRIE.F OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is 63 years old. He is an outomobile mechanic by trade and owns and operates
his own business known as J. P. Hanson Auto Service which is located at 125 West 21st South, Salt
Lake City, Utah. (R. 42, 43). On August 31, 1960
at approximately 11:30 a.m. plaintiff was driving
his 1936 Dodge one-half ton pickup truck east on
21st South Street in Salt Lake City intending to
deliver an automobile transmission to the Automatic
Exchange Transmission Company located at 17th
South and State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.
(R. 43).
As he reached the intersection at State Street
1
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in the left turn lane, the light turned red for east..
bound traffic and he stopped. He was the first car
at the intersection. He testified that his brake lights
were operating and his left turn signal light was
on. (R. 47). He did not give an arm signal of his
intention to stop. (R. 138, 140).
After coming to a stop, plaintiff's truck was
struck from the rear by the General Builders
Supply truck which was being driven by defendant,
Stephen G. Knight. He was in the course of making
a delivery of building materials and supplies and
had driven the 1950 Ford 11f2-ton flatbed truck from
General Builders Supply at 255 West 27th South in
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 171).
The plaintiff testified that his truck came to
rest in the extreme west lane of traffic on State
Street. (R. 137). Defendant, Stephen G. Knight,
testified that on impact he pushed plaintiff's truck
approximately 10 feet; that the front of his truck
was in the pedestrian lane when it stopped with 12
to 18 inches separating the front of his truck and
the rear of plaintiff's truck. (R. 174, 175). There
was no damage to the front of defendant's truck.
(R. 178}". The tail gate, rear fender and tail light
on plaintiff's 1936 Dodge pickup were damaged. (R.
50). Plain tiff made repairs in his own .shop for
which he claimed damages of $75.00. (R. 132, 133,
Exhibit 8).
Defendant, Stephen G. Knight, was 22 years
old; he had driven a truck for the General Builders
2
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Supply during the summer months since 1958. He
had a Class "A" chauffeur's license. (R. 170-171).
Just prior to the accident, he was traveling east
on 21st South Street at approximately 25 to 30 miles
per hour. As he approached the intersection of State
Street behind the plaintiff, he knew he was going
to have to stop. He applied his foot brake - there
was no response. He pumped the brake - there was
still no response so he applied the hand brake which
slowed him to approximately 5 miles per hour when
he ran into the rear of plaintiff's pickup truck. (R.
173).
The truck defendant was driving was used less
frequently than other trucks belonging to the
defendant, General Builders Supply. It was used
for incidental deliveries. He had driven the truck
on occasions prior to the accident. (R. 176).
On the morning of the accident, he had driven the
truck around in the defendant's building supply
yard picking up his load. He applied the brakes on
several occasions and noted nothing unusual about
the brakes. (R. 176, 177). He drove the truck from
27th South to 21st South and east to the point of the
accident but could not recall any specific point at
which he had to apply brakes prior to the accident
and after leaving the defendant's yard. (R. 177).
The brake lining on defendant's truck was checked
and examined by mechanic Gail R. Staley in May
of 1960. (R. 200). The brakes were also adusted by
Staley between July 7th and July 12th, 1960, six to
3
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seven weeks prior to the accident. (R. 198). Following the accident, plaintiff asked defendant, Knight,
what had happened. Knight stated that his brakes
had failed. (R. 48).
Immediately after the accident, the plaintiff got
out of his truck unassisted. He testified that he
was holding his neck and head, (R. 49) and was experiencing pain in his neck. (R. 49). He and defendant Knight moved the transmission that he was
hauling which weighed 180 lbs., to the forward end
of his truck. (R. 134). They exchanged names. No
police were called ~o make an investigation. (R. 50,
175). Plaintiff delivered the transmission to the
Automatic· Transmission Exchange Company and
then went to his home for the remainder of the day.
(R.- 50). He s·ecured a replacement transmission
the follo'Ying day returning it to his garage. Thereafter; he would go to his business for part of the
day but until the first of the year, left ·tlie'inechnical
rabor to his regular employees and did no labor himself. because of pain in his neck. At the tin:e of
the trial, he was still unable to perform some
mechanical labor that he had done prior to the accident. (R. 53, 142, 143). Plaintiff's books and records
reflect a continuous increase in net profits each
month and each year following the accident as compared with months and years prior thereto. (R. 143,
144, 148 through 150, Exhibits 9 and 10).
Plaintiff was examined and given adjustments
4
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by Dr. Billiter, a chiropractor, ten days or two
weeks following the accident. (R. 54, 124, 125). He
was examined on September 19, 1960, by Dr. Owen
Reese and continued under his care and treatment.
(R. 70, 78). Dr. Boyd Holbrook examined plaintiff
April 28, 1961, and on November 27, 1962. (R. 92,
96). Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Reed Clegg on
November 15, 1962.
Plaintiff had an extensive degenerative arthritis condition in his neck at the time of the accident.
(R. 74, 94, 95, 126, 127).

This case was tried to a jury beginning December 4, 1962. At the conclusion of the evidence, the
trial judge found the defendants liable as a matter
of law and submitted the case to the jury on the
question of damages alone. The jury awarded the
plaintiff $387.00 in special damages and the sum of
$22,500.00 in general damages.
·
Thereafter, a motion 'vas made on behalf of the
defendants for a new trial on the ground that the
Court erred in law by not submitting the issue of
defendant's liability to the jury and upon the further ground that the judgment was excessive. Defendants, by their motion in the alternative, asked
the trial Court to order a remittitur and reduce the
judgment to a reasonable amount based upon the
evidence. The defendants' motion was denied on
February 28, 1963. (R. 27).
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF POINTS ,
POINT I
THE· COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS LiABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND.IN REFUSIN<f TO 'SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS'
NEGLIGENCE r_fO THE ~U~Y.
., .
. POINT ll
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE, UNSUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND. IS THE RESULT OF PASSION
AND PREJUDICE AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR A NEW~TRIAL. OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO
ORDER A REMITTITUR.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS'
THE JURY.
NEGLIGENCE.
TO
.
.

The ·plaintiff claimed as specific acts of negligence that defendant Kn~ght was following too close
to plaintiff's vehicle, that he was not maintaining a
proper lookout arid that he was operating a vehicle
with·-defective orin'adequate brakes. The defendants
denied that they were negligent and denied any
knowledge of defective brakes prior to the accident.
(R. 4, 3~).
r The rule as ·to liability where an ·automobile is
operated- with defective brakes is set forth in Vol.
5A, A.m. Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic,
Section 248, and in .part states as follows:
"* * * th~ mere faihire, of brakes to func6
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tion properly is not conclusive of the driver's
negligence. It seems that where the brakes
on an automobile have previously functioned
properly but suddenly fail to respond, their
failure does not render the owner guilty of
negligence or contributory negligence, unless
he had knowledge of the defective condition."
In Alarid v. Vanier, 317 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1957),
the defendant's brakes failed to operate resulting in
a collision with another automobile which had
stopped in response to a signal light. The Court
said:
"In the absence of evidence indicating
that respondent was chargeable with knowledge that the brake was not or might not be
in good condition, the brake failure might
well be accepted by the jury a:s a sufficient
excuse or justification of the· violation. In
the driving of automobiles such brake failures
are not unknown and they frequently come
suddenly, without any warning. The average
driver is not a mechanical expert, and is not
necessarily in a position to anticipate such
mechanical failure. The essential question
in such case is not as to exactly what caused
the mechanical failure but is as to whether he
had or should have had some prior knowledge
of facts which should have led him to take
proper steps in advance which might have
prevented the brake failure. Unforeseen
brake failure is a circumstance beyond the
control of the driver in the ordinary case, and
the evidence here supports the implied find ..
ing of the jury that this brake failure resulted from a cause or thing beyond the
control of the respondent."
7
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In Lockmoeller v. Keil, 137 S.W.2d 625 (Mo.
1940), the Court stated:
"In this case the evidence that truck was
equipped with the kind of brakes contemplated by the statute, that they had been adjusted a week before the accident, and that
they had performed properly only one short
block to the east of the point of the collision
when they had last been applied, made it a
question for the jury as to whether defendants, Burns and Hamlet, were to be convicted
of actionable negligence because of the fact
that the brakes on their truck were not in
good working order at the very moment of
the collision."
, In Trudeau v. Sina Construction Company, 62
N.W.2d 492 (Minn. 1954), it was held that the failure
of truck brakes which had previously functioned
properly and which had been repaired two weeks
before the accident did not necessarily render owner
or operator of the truck guilty of negligence, but
presented merely prima facia case, and together
with evidence that operator of the truck had pumped
foot brake and had attepted to shift into a lower
gear to stop the truck as he approached the stop
sign, although he had not attempted to apply the
emergency brake, presented an issue for determination by jury as to whether the truck driver had been
confronted with an emergency not of his own making and as to whether or not he had acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted in the
same or similar circumstances.
8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Phillips v. Delta Motor Lines, 108 So. 409
(Miss. 1959), the Court held that:
"The fact that brakes of an automobile
are defective is material in determining the
question of negligence in case of a collision
where the driver knew or should by proper
care have known of the defect, but mere failure of brakes to function properly is not conclusive of the driver's negligence but only
makes a prima facia case which the driver
may defend by showing proper inspection
and a sudden failure without warning."
In Eddy v. McAninch, 347 P.2d 499 (Colo. 1959),
the defendant had purchased an automobile a week
before the accident. He testified that he had had no
trouble until the time of the accident; that as heapproached the intersection where the collision occurred, he attempted to apply his brakes but there
was no response; that he then tried to use his hand
brake with the same result. There was evidence that
the brakes had been inspected and were in good condition before the sale of the automobile to the defendant. Upon a jury verdict in favor of the
defendant, plaintiff appealed claiming defendant
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. The
Colorado Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment, cited the case of Alarid v. Vanier, supra, and
stated in conclusion:
"Under the circumstances appearing
from this record, we think the question of
whether the presumption of negligence arising from failure of the defendant's brakes to
9
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operate in accordance with the provisions of
the Motor Vehicle Law, had been overcome
by evidence, and that the accident resulted
from causes beyond the control of the defendant, was one of fact for the jury which by
its verdict re'Solved the issue in favor of the
defendant. * * *"
In Best v. Huber, 3 U.2d 177, 281 P.2d 208,
(Utah 1955), the defendant testified that she was
traveling about 25 miles per hour and that she applied her brakes 21/2 to 3 car lengths away from the
plaintiff's car, which was stopped at an intersection;
that when 'She pressed the brake pedal, it went to
the floor board. She pumped the brakes two or
three times and didn't have time to use the hand
brake nor turn aside in order to avoid hitting plaintiff's car in the rear. She further testified that she
had used the foot brake on a hill just previous to the
accident and that at that time she had full braking
power and was surpri'Sed by the sudden failure of
the brakes at the intersection.
Upon a jury verdict for the plaintiff, defendant
appealed contending that the accident resulted from
an unforseeable mechanical failure and that she was
not liable as a matter of law.
The Court in affirming the judgment and holding that the evidence presented a jury question said:
"It has been frequently announced by
thi'S Court that negligence is a question for
the jury unless all reasonable men must draw
the same conclusion from the facts as they
10
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are shown (cases cited). 'As was ·said·in Linden v. Anchor Mining Company~ 20 Utah 134,
58 Pac. 355, 358: ·'Where there is uncertainty
as to the existence of either negligence or
contributory negligence, the question is not
one of law, but of fact, and to ·be settled by
a jury; and this, whether the·· ·Uncertainty
arises from a conflict in the testimo:ny or
because the facts, being· undisp~ted," fairminded men will honestly draw different-con:.
elusions from them.' "
There was no· evidence that the defendant,
Stephen G. Knight, was following too close or that
he failed to maintain a proper lookout. His· testimony that his brakes failed to respond suddenly and
without prior warning coupled with· the; eviderice
of prior inspection and adustrnent by the mechanic
that maintained defendant's equip:ment clearly,
raised issues as to the defendant's negligence that
should have been submitted to the jury.·
POINT ll
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE, UNSUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND IS THE RESULT OF PASSION
AND PREJUDICE AND THE TRIAL-COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS'. MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO
ORDER A REMITTITUR.

Appellants recognize that plaintiff testified at
the trial that he was not aware of the fact :that he
4ad an osteoarthritic condition in his neck prior to
the accident and that he had not suffered any pain
from his neck before the accident.· (R. 65, 66). Dr.
Rees and ·Dr. Holbrook both testifi<~d that, assumll
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ing the plaintiff had had no pain before the accident, the accident could have precipitated the pain
and stiffness complained of by the plaintiff. (R. 77,
99). Dr. Holbrook e'Stimated that the plaintiff had
a 20% disability that might be reduced to 10%
through surgery. (R. 104).
It is undisputed, however, that plaintiff had a
pre-existing arthritic condition in his neck. Both
Drs. Holbrook and Clegg, who are specialists in the
field of orthopedics, testified as to thi'S condition.
Dr. Holbrook described the condition as "rather
marked degenerative changes in the lower portions;
that is, between the fifth and sixth and seventh
cervical vertebrae." (R. 94). Dr. Clegg described
plaintiff's neck condition as one involving extensive
degenerative arthritis and that t had developed to
the extent that the fourth and fifth cervical vertebrae had fused together making a solid union. (R.
126, 127.) Dr. Holbrook stated that the plaintiff's
symptoms could be secondary to his arthritis (R.
108) and that examining earlier x-rays taken by
Dr. Reese he found no evidence of fracture or tone
injury related to the accident. (R. 107).
Dr. Clegg, from his examination, found no evidence of trauma or injury from whiplash and testified that the rather extensive osteoarthritic changes
in plaintiff's neck were sufficient to account for
plantiff's complaint of pain, tenderness and muscle
spasm and that the syn1pton1s were consistent with
the degree of arthritis fron1 which plaintiff was
12
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mffering. (R. 128. While plaintiff testified that
1e was unable to perform lal::or at. h1s garage for
;orne three or four months following the accident,
1e admitted that he made daily visits to his garage
where his regular mechanics were working. (R.
L42, 143). His books and records disclos·e an in;rease in his business and net profits during this
period as compared with similar periods prior to
the accident, as well as an increase in his· annual
aet profits each year following the.accidertt as compared with prior years. (R . .~4?, 148 through 150,
Exhibit 9 and 10).
. nr ~:~Lr .:
This Court, in several cas'ci, held that a verdict
so excessive as to appear. to hav:e .been given under
the influence of passion and prejudice; and the trial
Court abusing its discretion in denyitrg· a mo'tion
for a new trial, may order the ·verdicbset aside and
a new trial granted. Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah
431; 184 -P.2d 123.
The Court has quoted with approval the'·language of the Pauly v. McCarthy.case. In the case
of Stamp v. Union Pacific Railroad· Company, 5
Utah d 387; 303 P2d 279, the opinion approved the
statement of the law in the Pauly v. McCarthy case
and quoted from that case as follows:
"Attention is called to the language of
this Court in that (Pauly v. McCarthy) case
as follows at pages 434-6 of the Utah Reports
and page 125) of the Pacific Reporter: ·'but
from the language used in these and .other
decisions, a view developed that· this Court
13
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was powerless to interfere with a jury ~er
dict, no matter how outrageous. Th1s VIew
was exploded in the case of Jensen v. Denver
& R.G.W.R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185,
1192, where, after citing with approval many
of the cases above cited, we said: 'still the
jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled
and unchecked. Hence the Code that a new
trial on motion of the aggrieved party may
be granted by the court below on the ground
of 'exces'Sive damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.' Whenever that is made to appear,
the Court, when its action is properly invoked, should require a remission or set the
verdict aside and grant a new trial."'"
This Court has held that it can and should grant
a new trial if the verdict is so excessive as to show
that it must have been motivated by prejudice or
ill will toward a litigant, or that passion such as
anger, resentment, indignation or some kindred
emotion has so overcome or distorted the jury's
reason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful or
punitive, it should unconditionally re set aside.
Wheat v. D&RGWR Company, 122 Utah 418, 250
P.2d 932.

Appellants recognize that the Utah Court recnizes two clas'Ses of cases: one class of cases where
a new trial must be ordered if the verdict is the
result of passion and prejudice, and a class of cases
whereby a remittitur is demanded by the ends of
justice. Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P.2d
123; Morg.an v. Ogden Union Depot, 77 Utah 541,
14
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294 P.2d 541, Ward v. D&RGWR Co., 96 Utah 564,
85 P.2d 837.
The Utah Court has long held that it may be
proper to order a remission of the excess verdict
where passion and prejudice were not necessarily
present, but if passion and prejudice were present,
a new trial 'Should be granted. See Eleganti v.
Standard Coal Company, 50 Utah 585, 168 Pac. 266,
and McAfee v. Ogden Union R.R. Depot Co., 62
Utah 116, 218 Pac. 98.
In the case of Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 118 Utah 82, 218 P~2d 1080, the Court
said:
"Previously decided cases ar·e of little
value in fixing present day. standards or in
assisting courts in determining excessive
awards."
This quotation wa;s approved in Stamp v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company case, 5 U.2d 387, 303
P.2d 279, and the Court in that case in ordering a
remittitur or a new trial stated:
"Holding as we do, that the verdict is
without all reasonable bounds for the detailed
injury, we then have the duty of ordering a
new trial, or ordering a remittitur. Since
the jury's verdict can be of no help to us,
we must exercise our best judgment in arriving at a fair and just amount to compensate plaintiff for his injury."
In that case quoted there was nothing for the
Court upon which to base a holding of passion and
prejudice except the amount of the verdict.
15
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The plaintiff is 63 years old. He was never
hospitalized following the accident. He followed
only a conservative treatment under the care of
Dr. Reese. He had a marked degenerative arthritic
condition in his neck at the time of the accident.
While curtailing his physical labor following the accident, he admittedly continued daily contact and
supervision of his business. The sum of $22,500.00
general damages in such a case clearly appears to
have been given as a result of passion and prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The appellants respectfully represent to the
Court that the defendants should be awarded a new
trial or in the alternative the Court should order
a remittitur and reduce the judgment to a reasonable amount based upon the evidence of the case.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN and
ROBERT W. BRANDT
Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

16
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